Stop Claude Code from deleting a critical path
Wire DefenseClaw into Claude Code, collect representative observe-mode traffic, then safely verify CMD-RM-RF against a disposable path.
"I want to observe Claude Code and block recursive force deletion against critical system paths."
That sentence is the original DefenseClaw user story. Here is the entire flow, end to end.
Outcome
By the end of this story, you'll have:
- Claude Code wired to DefenseClaw via native hooks + OTel.
- Representative audit data in
~/.defenseclaw/audit.dbfor the lifecycle and native telemetry surfaces DefenseClaw receives. - An
actionmode policy that blocks recursive force deletion under protected root prefixes with a CRITICAL finding. - An audit row showing the block, with the rule reference for the next reviewer.
Wire Claude Code (observability only)
defenseclaw setup claude-codeThis is the observability-only alias. Claude Code talks directly to its native upstream. DefenseClaw inspects through the 28 registered lifecycle events—including PreToolUse, PostToolUse, UserPromptSubmit, Stop, and PermissionRequest—and receives native OTel logs and metrics.
Watch the audit log fill up
Open the live dashboard:
defenseclaw tuiOr inspect a scriptable snapshot from mandatory SQLite event history:
defenseclaw-gateway audit export --connector claudecode --output - \
| tail -n 200 \
| jq 'select(.connector == "claudecode")'Open Claude Code and use it normally. DefenseClaw records the 28 supported lifecycle events plus the native OTel logs and metrics that Claude Code emits; it does not claim activity outside those registered surfaces. Collect enough representative traffic to understand your agent before the first block decision.
Inspect the rule pack
ls ~/.defenseclaw/policies/guardrail/default/
sed -n '80,125p' ~/.defenseclaw/policies/guardrail/default/rules/commands.yamlThe CMD-RM-RF rule is CRITICAL and matches / plus protected top-level
prefixes such as /etc, /var, /home, /usr, and /opt. It deliberately
does not flag every rm -rf command or arbitrary home subdirectory. The three
bundled packs currently carry the same command-rule boundary; their policy
thresholds and other configuration differ.
Promote to action mode with HITL
defenseclaw setup claude-code \
--mode action \
--rule-pack default \
--human-approval \
--hilt-min-severity high \
--restartThe enforcement flags here are:
--mode action— CRITICAL findings now block.--human-approval— HIGH findings become confirmation requests on ask-capable events.--hilt-min-severity high— MEDIUM and LOW do not enter HITL; eligible HIGH findings can prompt, while CRITICAL findings remain blocks.
Claude Code supports native PreToolUse ask, so the approval prompt surfaces inside the agent UI itself.
Trigger the rule
Create an empty target so the exercise remains safe even if the connector is not enforcing:
mkdir -p /var/tmp/defenseclaw-demo-emptyThen ask Claude Code:
Please run
rm -rf /var/tmp/defenseclaw-demo-empty.
The PreToolUse hook fires, the gateway scores the command, the default rule pack
returns CMD-RM-RF at CRITICAL, and Claude Code receives a deny decision before
the shell runs.
Confirm in the audit log
defenseclaw alerts --limit 10
# or inspect the mandatory SQLite history filtered by severity:
defenseclaw-gateway audit export --connector claudecode --output - \
| tail -n 200 \
| jq 'select(.connector == "claudecode" and (.severity == "HIGH" or .severity == "CRITICAL"))'Inspect the matching event's stable connector, severity, action, and
structured.rule_ids fields; exact IDs and timestamps are generated at
runtime.
Because the denied command did not remove the empty fixture, clean it up outside the agent:
rmdir /var/tmp/defenseclaw-demo-emptyWhy this works the way it does
rm -rf /var/tmp/defenseclaw-demo-empty
PreToolUse(command)
POST /api/v1/claudecode/hook
evaluate(command)
CRITICAL · CMD-RM-RF
block · recursive delete
block
Tool call denied
Variations
Next
Stories
Concrete walkthroughs for the things people actually want — block rm -rf on Claude Code, catch a prompt injection on Codex, stop secret exfiltration from Cursor, approve risky tool calls, pin local observability, and switch connectors without losing audit history.
Catch a prompt injection on Codex
Verify Codex prompt enforcement with the bundled TRUST-IGNORE-PREVIOUS rule, then add the optional judge for ambiguous and semantic cases.