Enterprise deployment

What DefenseClaw enterprise hardening is, which profile to choose, what runs on each endpoint, and what a standard user can and cannot change on Windows, Linux, and macOS.

Enterprise deployment installs DefenseClaw as operating-system services that administrators own. Users, and the agents they run, cannot stop the services or change the policy.

Enterprise managed demo (about 17 minutes): identity-based policies, observability and agent identity. Active Directory users and groups map to strict and standard guardrail profiles on a managed Linux host and a managed Windows host. Claude Code and Codex run as those users, defenseclaw enterprise linux profile-explain shows which profile applies to a user, and a command the profile forbids is blocked with its rule named while ordinary work runs. Grafana dashboards show the fleet, the allow and block decisions, and agent discovery with each agent's identity. Recorded on an earlier 1.0 build, so some screens and messages differ from the current release.

Is this for you?

One person, one computer: use the open-source install (Quickstart). A fleet your IT team manages: use enterprise deployment. You need an MDM, configuration-management tool or administrator shell that runs commands as SYSTEM or root, and agents that run as standard users. In the config it is deployment_mode: managed_enterprise (definition). Ready? Deploy to a fleet has six steps.

Two profiles

DetailStandaloneSecure Client
Choose it whenYou deploy with an MDM, package or admin shellYou run Cisco Secure Client
PlatformsWindows, Linux, macOSWindows, macOS
Who decidesThe local policy engine, plus Cisco AI Defense when you store a keyCisco AI Defense only
Documented inThis sectionSecure Client

One profile per computer, fixed at install (enterprise.profile and DEFENSECLAW_ENTERPRISE_PROFILE must agree). With neither set, Windows and macOS use secure_client and Linux uses standalone, so set enterprise.profile: standalone on Windows and macOS.

The rest of this section covers the standalone profile.

What runs where

Every endpoint runs four services and one program: the gateway decides on each tool call, the guardian repairs each user's hooks, the enumerator finds the users, and the sensor helper answers discovery questions. The hook is an administrator-owned program the agent runs as the user.

installs
writes
writes
adds hooks, as the user
registers hooks
runs
asks · caller checked
read by
TrustedZ0 · Admin (root · SYSTEM)
PrivilegedZ1 · Services
ProtectedZ3 · Admin-owned files
UntrustedZ4 · User session (the user)
RestrictedZ2 · Gateway (service account)
MDM or adminruns the lifecycle
Guardiankeeps hooks in place
Config and policysecrets
Agent machine policyCodex · Claude Code
AI agentruns as the user
defenseclaw-hookruns on each hooked tool call
Gatewayallows or blocks

List view for small screens. Use the expand button to open the drawing.

TrustedZ0 · Admin (root · SYSTEM)

  1. MDM or adminruns the lifecycle
    • installsGuardianZ1
    • writesConfig and policyZ3
    • writesAgent machine policyZ3

PrivilegedZ1 · Services

  1. Guardiankeeps hooks in place
    • adds hooks, as the userAI agentZ4

ProtectedZ3 · Admin-owned files

  1. Config and policysecrets
    • read byGatewayZ2
  2. Agent machine policyCodex · Claude Code
    • registers hooksAI agentZ4

UntrustedZ4 · User session (the user)

  1. AI agentruns as the user
    • runsdefenseclaw-hook
  2. defenseclaw-hookruns on each hooked tool call
    • asks · caller checkedGatewayZ2

RestrictedZ2 · Gateway (service account)

  1. Gatewayallows or blocks
Standalone profile, every OS. An arrow that crosses a zone border is a trust boundary. On Windows the guardian, not the lifecycle, writes the machine policy for every agent except Codex.

How far the hook reaches depends on the connector. Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode load DefenseClaw's hooks from administrator-owned machine policy, so a supported client starts with them. Per-user connectors (Devin, Antigravity, Hermes, Amp, Kiro) are registered only in the agent's default config: a session started with another config home, devin --config <file> or Hermes --safe-mode has no hook inspection for its tool calls. Managed status and verify report a running bypass and write an audit alert. The threat model lists each case.

The gateway listens on 127.0.0.1:18970; the guardian reconciles every minute and the enumerator runs every five. Service names per OS are in Concepts, and the files in each zone in the threat model and the install pages (Windows, Linux, macOS).

Who can change what

Administrators and the MDM write the config, policies, secrets, binaries, services and vendor machine policy. A standard user, and any agent they run, can write none of them; an agent with unrestricted sudo or administrator rights is an administrator. The guardian repairs DefenseClaw's entries in each user's agent config, and the foreign-hook guard handles hooks a user adds. The threat model lists what a standard user cannot do and the risks that remain.

Policy changes on a managed host

On a managed standalone host, config.yaml and the policy assets it names are the only policy. Only the lifecycle (and a migration it runs) writes the config. Under the Secure Client profile none of this applies. The model is in Configuration: one source of truth.

On Linux and macOS the enterprise package installs defenseclaw as a launcher that runs only the commands in Managed command availability. Every other command prints this and exits 2:

This computer is managed; use `defenseclaw status` for your protection state, `defenseclaw sandbox status` for your sandboxes and `defenseclaw sandbox policy explain` for your policy. For administrator views, run `sudo /opt/defenseclaw/bin/defenseclaw-gateway enterprise linux status`, `sudo /opt/defenseclaw/bin/defenseclaw-gateway enterprise linux verify`, or `sudo /opt/defenseclaw/bin/defenseclaw-gateway audit export --since 2h`. The managed launcher does not offer doctor, alerts, or tui.

This computer is managed; use `defenseclaw status` for your protection state, `defenseclaw sandbox status` for your sandboxes and `defenseclaw sandbox policy explain` for your policy. For administrator views, run `sudo /opt/cisco/defenseclaw/bin/defenseclaw-gateway enterprise macos status`, `sudo /opt/cisco/defenseclaw/bin/defenseclaw-gateway enterprise macos verify`, or `sudo /opt/cisco/defenseclaw/bin/defenseclaw-gateway audit export --since 2h`. The managed launcher does not offer doctor, alerts, or tui.

The first message is the Linux text and the second is the macOS text; the administrator-view commands name the installed gateway of that platform.

Windows has no launcher: defenseclaw.exe there is the administrator command. Setup puts no DefenseClaw command on PATH, so run it by its full path: & 'C:\Program Files\Cisco\DefenseClaw\bin\defenseclaw.exe' ... in PowerShell, or "C:\Program Files\Cisco\DefenseClaw\bin\defenseclaw.exe" ... in cmd.exe. It refuses the per-user writers itself:

Attempt on managed WindowsResult
config set, config unsetExit 3: This device is managed: change config.yaml in the admin config (MDM or management plane); config set did not change it
skill, mcp, plugin or tool with block, allow or unblockExit 3, naming the asset_policy key in the admin config and saying the command did not change it
init, quickstart, guardrail, policy activateExit 2: not a command of the administrator's defenseclaw.exe

A standard account's & 'C:\Program Files\Cisco\DefenseClaw\bin\defenseclaw.exe' status (and status --json) shows that account's own Claude Code and Cowork protection state and its own last Cowork event, which the gateway service reads for the account that asks, never another account's. From an elevated prompt status names the administrator's enterprise windows status --profile standalone.

The table below is for a per-user CLI left from an earlier install on Linux and macOS.

Local writers refuse

A per-user Python CLI left from an earlier install also finds the host managed. It refuses these attempts, also for root, and writes nothing:

AttemptResult
defenseclaw config set KEY VALUE, config unset KEYExit 3: error: This device is managed: change config.yaml in the admin config (MDM or management plane), not on the device
defenseclaw skill, mcp, plugin or tool with block, allow or unblockExit 3: This device is managed: the asset_policy block and allow lists are set in the admin config (MDM or management plane)
defenseclaw init, defenseclaw quickstart, and any command that needs a per-user configExit 3: This device is managed: DefenseClaw is configured by your administrator (MDM or management plane), so there is no per-user config to create and 'defenseclaw init' does not apply. Nothing was changed.
guardrail block-at, policy activate, the setup commands that write config, the TUI config editorRefused by the same writer. The TUI shows Config save failed: and the message
POST or DELETE on the gateway's /enforce/block, POST on /enforce/allowHTTP 403 with {"error": "managed_device", "detail": "policy changes are made in the management plane"}

The gateway records each refusal in the audit log with outcome=refused reason=managed_device. On Linux and macOS the launcher (for config, guardrail, policy and asset writers, setup, upgrade, rollback and uninstall) and the CLI report through the hook socket, so a standard user's refusal is recorded with the account the kernel reports (actor=uid:501 user=alice). On Windows defenseclaw.exe reports its refusals on the gateway's refusal pipe, which names the account from its Windows token (actor=sid:S-1-5-21-... user=HOST\alice); a standard account's enterprise windows lifecycle command is recorded with reason=elevation_required (Windows).

To block or allow an asset, add it to asset_policy in the admin config and apply the config:

config.yaml (excerpt)
asset_policy:
  skill:
    denied:
      - name: acme-unapproved-skill
        reason: not approved

Runtime actions stay allowed

Quarantine and restore, runtime disable and enable, approvals (HITL) and discovery are runtime state, not policy.

The environment cannot weaken the host

Every DEFENSECLAW_* variable has a managed setting in the registry. ignore variables read as unset, from the process environment and from .env files. tighten_only variables (DEFENSECLAW_STRICT_AVAILABILITY and DEFENSECLAW_MANAGED_TRUST_STRICT_ANCESTORS) count only when they make the setting stricter. Managed hooks ignore DEFENSECLAW_HOOK_MAX_BODY and keep their fixed 1 MiB body cap. allow variables are read as set. A forged DEFENSECLAW_DEPLOYMENT_MODE or DEFENSECLAW_ENTERPRISE_PROFILE cannot make the host look local: the host is managed because config.yaml says so. Hook fail mode comes only from installed policy; the agent environment cannot change it. defenseclaw doctor names ignored variables, never their values.

Local block and allow rows are ignored

The gateway decides from asset_policy, not from the actions table of audit.db. When ensure migrates a config on a host that holds such rows, it adds the warning local_enforcement_entries_ignored.

Supported platforms and agents

Windows x64 (PowerShell 7 required), Linux with systemd 239 or later, and macOS 13 or later on Apple silicon (requirements). Agents are protected through machine policy (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, OpenCode) or per user (Devin, Antigravity, Hermes, Amp, Kiro). OpenClaw and ZeptoClaw are not supported. See the support matrix.

A minimal config

The administrator config is one YAML file. This one protects Codex and Claude Code in observe mode. Where it goes on each OS, and every enterprise.* setting, are in Configuration.

config.yaml
config_version: 9
deployment_mode: managed_enterprise
# data_dir: Linux /var/lib/defenseclaw, macOS /opt/cisco/defenseclaw/runtime,
# Windows leave unset. The path is fixed.
enterprise:
  profile: standalone
gateway:
  api_bind: 127.0.0.1
  api_port: 18970
guardrail:
  enabled: true
  mode: observe                         # observe | action
  connectors:
    codex: {}
    claudecode: {}

Nothing is protected until you list agents under guardrail.connectors. Observe mode records every decision without blocking on policy verdicts; set mode: action to enforce. The AI Defense key never goes in the config (Cisco AI Defense key).

Next steps

Deploy to a fleet, Plan a rollout, Install on one computer and the threat model.