Telemetry and security

Windows enforcement and telemetry are separate paths. Hooks and Amp's tool.call plugin callback can return a decision; native OTLP cannot. Every supported event channel enters an authenticated loopback gateway and then uses the same local audit and optional outbound observability pipeline.

Connector telemetry channels

Codex and Claude Code configure a connector-scoped bearer and source/client identity for native OTLP. Codex does not place the credential in the endpoint URL. Claude Code stores the managed exporter settings in its configuration, not in the interactive shell. Amp has no native-OTLP credential because it has no documented native exporter; its plugin uses a connector-scoped hook credential. A scoped credential is accepted only for its connector and route; it cannot authenticate the management API, another connector, or a non-loopback request.

Local audit is always present

The v8 observability pipeline writes mandatory local SQLite audit data to %USERPROFILE%\.defenseclaw\audit.db. That local store continues when:

• no remote observability destination is configured;
• the installation is operating without an OpenClaw fleet uplink; or
• an optional remote destination is temporarily degraded.

In the supported standalone hook topology, “gateway disabled” in a fleet row means there is no OpenClaw fleet WebSocket to dial. It does not mean the local hook/plugin API, policy evaluation, native OTLP ingest, local audit, alerts, or TUI have stopped.

gateway.jsonl is not a default audit file. It exists only if an optional kind: jsonl destination is configured to write that path. The detached gateway's process log is a different file, %USERPROFILE%\.defenseclaw\gateway.log.

Privacy and redaction boundary

Supported connector profiles enable source capture of user-prompt facts so the v8 router can apply destination-specific policy. The fresh v8 redaction profile is none. Therefore:

• local SQLite can contain unredacted prompt, tool, decision, and telemetry content permitted by the event schema;
• adding an outbound destination does not automatically make its projection safe for a different audience; and
• source-side suppression cannot be assumed to recover content that was never captured.

Treat the data directory and any audit export as sensitive user data. Configure and verify redaction profiles before routing records to another system. defenseclaw config show masks secret values by default. Configuration v8 rejects config show --reveal; do not rely on that legacy flag in diagnostic workflows.

The gateway records authentication and delivery failures without putting raw scoped credentials into route names or operational telemetry. That does not make a copied database, log, connector configuration, backup, or crash artifact safe to publish.

Credential model

DefenseClaw uses distinct credentials for distinct jobs:

Rotate safely

Token rotation is global because the gateway master token and active connector generation must move together:

defenseclaw setup rotate-token --yes

The transaction verifies gateway A, stops that exact owned process, durably commits the new protected value, starts gateway B, reconciles all active connectors, reloads their persisted native-OTLP settings, and authentication-probes each supported signal. A post-stop failure restores the exact prior protected file and ready gateway generation. --no-restart is intentionally refused, and an externally managed noncanonical token environment is not rewritten.

Connector-scoped OTLP credentials remain distinct from the master token. The rotation does not expose them and does not turn one connector's credential into a cross-connector credential. Restart every configured Codex or Claude Code agent, and fully exit and relaunch Amp, after a successful rotation so the next hook or plugin callback uses the reconciled generation.

Verify without reading any token:

defenseclaw-gateway status
defenseclaw status
defenseclaw doctor

Loopback and network boundaries

The certified connector topology uses the current user's native agent and gateway on loopback, normally 127.0.0.1:18970. The loopback HTTP receiver is authenticated; it is not a claim that localhost is inherently trusted.

• A connector-scoped token is restricted by connector, route, signal, and loopback origin.
• Management routes require their own authentication.
• A non-loopback agent-to-gateway deployment is not native Windows-certified.
• Outbound OTLP, Splunk, Galileo, webhooks, and provider calls are independent client connections. Their availability does not expand hook coverage.
• Windows OpenClaw/ZeptoClaw proxy listeners are unsupported.

Do not expose the local API to a LAN merely to make a remote agent work. That changes the tested topology and adds authentication, TLS, firewall, and host ownership requirements this guide does not certify.

Release and installer trust

The current 0.8.10 Windows release trust chain is:

1. verify the release's checksum set against its Sigstore certificate and release-workflow identity;
2. require the Setup SHA-256 named by that authenticated checksum set;
3. require the authenticated provenance to describe the same artifact and signing state; and
4. verify that Windows observes the matching Authenticode state; and
5. certify that exact signed Setup through the deterministic native Windows x64 matrix for Codex, Claude Code, and Amp.

The deterministic native gate is the certification basis. A separately configured real-agent run can add upstream smoke evidence, but it is not a substitute for that gate. In particular, an authenticated Amp turn requires AMP_API_KEY; the absence or presence of that optional secret does not change the packaged native Windows support classification.

For 0.8.10, the authenticated provenance says unsigned: true and product_executables_authenticode_signed: false; Windows observes the outer Setup as NotSigned. The release bytes are therefore authenticated by the Sigstore-signed checksum set, not by an Authenticode publisher. Do not expect or claim a Cisco Systems, Inc. Digital Signatures entry.

Local and pull-request artifacts do not carry authenticated production release provenance. Passing their deterministic suites proves code and lifecycle behavior, not that they are a published release artifact.

The native upgrader refuses a missing or invalid authenticated checksum set, digest, provenance, a mismatch between recorded and observed Authenticode state, or an unauthorized Windows source baseline. Its verification bypass is not supported for native Windows. See Install and maintain.

Ownership and filesystem boundary

The public package runs as the current user and owns only exact state it created or recorded. Security-sensitive installer transaction directories, credentials, audit storage, and identity records use current-user ownership, non-reparse checks, and private Windows DACL validation. This is not a blanket claim that every file below every user-selected connector root has an identical DACL.

Setup and lifecycle commands:

• refuse an existing application directory without valid DefenseClaw installer state;
• recheck state identity around live mutation;
• reject unsafe reparse ancestry for protected transaction and recorded connector-home paths;
• stop only a gateway/watchdog whose executable, PID start identity, data root, and protected record agree;
• refuse to replace a foreign HKCU Run value, PATH mutation, Installed Apps record, listener, process, or connector file; and
• retain ambiguous recovery evidence instead of deleting it as cleanup.

Product executables opt into Windows long-path behavior, and installer journals and process identity are tested beyond legacy MAX_PATH. Do not extrapolate that guarantee to every third-party agent/plugin. Avoid connector paths that differ only by case; the product does not advertise case-distinct Windows connector homes as separate supported identities.

Transaction and fail-closed boundaries

“Fail closed” has several precise meanings:

Malformed v8 configuration prevents strict gateway startup rather than silently loading legacy semantics. A disabled connector is reconciled out of the active roster; a persisted change made with --no-restart is reported as desired/runtime drift until restart.

Administrator-managed Claude Code exception

The public per-user Setup does not install a machine-wide service or enterprise guardian. A separate, limited gateway command can publish Claude Code managed hooks for allow-listed interactive users only when the gateway and hook binary have first been deployed in a protected Administrator/LocalSystem-owned machine path. A user-writable %LOCALAPPDATA% installation is deliberately rejected as the elevated command source.

That path does not provide a machine-scope Setup/MSI, general Windows connector guardian, remote gateway, private distribution credentials, or Codex managed hook support. Follow the exact prerequisites in Enterprise deployment.

Security operations links

• Configuration
• Environment variables
• Fail modes
• Redaction
• Observability
• Skill scanner
• MCP scanner